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Abstract
Data Mining has wide applications in many areas such as banking, medicine, scientific research and among gov-
ernment agencies. Classification is one of the commonly used tasks in data mining applications. For the past decade,
due to the rise of various privacy issues, many theoretical and practical solutions to the classification problem have
been proposed under different security models. However, with the recent popularity of cloud computing, users now
have the opportunity to outsource their data, in encrypted form, as well as the data mining tasks to the cloud. Since the
data on the cloud is in encrypted form, existing privacy preserving classification techniques are not applicable. In this
paper, we focus on solving the classification problem over encrypted data. In particular, we propose a secure k-NN
classifier over encrypted data in the cloud. The proposed k-NN protocol protects the confidentiality of the data, user’s
input query, and data access patterns. To the best of our knowledge, our work is the first to develop a secure k-NN
classifier over encrypted data under the standard semi-honest model. Also, we empirically analyze the efficiency of
our solution through various experiments.
Keywords - Security, k-NN Classifier, Outsourced Databases, Encryption
1 Introduction
Recently, the cloud computing paradigm [10, 42] is revolutionizing the organizations’ way of operating their data
particularly in the way they store, access and process data. As an emerging computing paradigm, cloud computing
attracts many organizations to consider seriously regarding cloud potential in terms of its cost-efficiency, flexibility, and
offload of administrative overhead. Most often, the organizations delegate their computational operations in addition
to their data to the cloud.
Despite tremendous advantages that the cloud offers, privacy and security issues in the cloud are preventing com-
panies to utilize those advantages. When data are highly sensitive, the data need to be encrypted before outsourcing to
the cloud. However, when data are encrypted, irrespective of the underlying encryption scheme, performing any data
mining tasks becomes very challenging without ever decrypting the data [46, 49]. In addition, there are other privacy
concerns, demonstrated by the following example.
Example 1 Suppose an insurance company outsourced its encrypted customers database and relevant data mining
tasks to a cloud. When an agent from the company wants to determine the risk level of a potential new customer, the
agent can use a classification method to determine the risk level of the customer. First, the agent needs to generate a
data record q for the customer containing certain personal information of the customer, e.g., credit score, age, marital
status, etc. Then this record can be sent to the cloud, and the cloud will compute the class label for q. Nevertheless,
since q contains sensitive information, to protect the customer’s privacy, q should be encrypted before sending it to the
cloud.
The above example shows that data mining over encrypted data (DMED) on a cloud also needs to protect a user’s
record when the record is a part of a data mining process. Moreover, cloud can also derive useful and sensitive
information about the actual data items by observing the data access patterns even if the data are encrypted [19, 52].
Therefore, the privacy/security requirements of the DMED problem on a cloud are threefold: (1) confidentiality of the
encrypted data, (2) confidentiality of a user’s query record, and (3) hiding data access patterns.
Existing work on Privacy-Preserving Data Mining (either perturbation or secure multi-party computation based
approach) cannot solve the DMED problem. Perturbed data do not possess semantic security, so data perturbation
techniques cannot be used to encrypt highly sensitive data. Also the perturbed data do not produce very accurate
data mining results. Secure multi-party computation based approach assumes data are distributed and not encrypted
at each participating party. In addition, many intermediate computations are performed based on non-encrypted data.
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As a result, in this paper, we proposed novel methods to effectively solve the DMED problem assuming that the
encrypted data are outsourced to a cloud. Specifically, we focus on the classification problem since it is one of the
most common data mining tasks. Because each classification technique has their own advantage, to be concrete,
this paper concentrates on executing the k-nearest neighbor classification method over encrypted data in the cloud
computing environment.
1.1 Problem Definition
Suppose Alice owns a database D of n records t1, . . . , tn and m+ 1 attributes. Let ti,j denote the jth attribute value
of record ti. Initially, Alice encrypts her database attribute-wise, that is, she computes Epk(ti,j), for 1 ≤ i ≤ n and
1 ≤ j ≤ m+1, where column (m+1) contains the class labels. We assume that the underlying encryption scheme is
semantically secure [45]. Let the encrypted database be denoted by D′. We assume that Alice outsources D′ as well
as the future classification process to the cloud.
Let Bob be an authorized user who wants to classify his input record q = 〈q1, . . . , qm〉 by applying the k-NN
classification method based on D′. We refer to such a process as privacy-preserving k-NN (PPkNN) classification
over encrypted data in the cloud. Formally, we define the PPkNN protocol as:
PPkNN(D′, q)→ cq
where cq denotes the class label for q after applying k-NN classification method on D′ and q.
1.2 Our Contribution
In this paper, we propose a novel PPkNN protocol, a secure k-NN classifier over semantically secure encrypted data.
In our protocol, once the encrypted data are outsourced to the cloud, Alice does not participate in any computations.
Therefore, no information is revealed to Alice. In particular, our protocol meets the following privacy requirements:
• Contents of D or any intermediate results should not be revealed to the cloud.
• Bob’s query q should not be revealed to the cloud.
• cq should be revealed only to Bob. In addition, no information other than cq should be revealed to Bob.
• Data access patterns, such as the records corresponding to the k-nearest neighbors of q, should not be revealed
to Bob and the cloud (to prevent any inference attacks).
We emphasize that the intermediate results seen by the cloud in our protocol are either newly generated randomized
encryptions or random numbers. Thus, which data records correspond to the k-nearest neighbors and the output class
label are not known to the cloud. In addition, after sending his encrypted query record to the cloud, Bob does not
involve in any computations. Hence, data access patterns are further protected from Bob. More details are given in
Section 5.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We discuss the existing related work and some concepts as a
background in Section 2. A set of privacy-preserving protocols and their possible implementations are provided in
Section 3. The proposed PPkNN protocol is explained in detail in Section 5. Section 6 discusses the performance of
the proposed protocol based on various experiments. We conclude the paper along with future work in Section 7.
2 RELATED WORK
In this section, we first present existing work related to privacy preserving data mining and query processing over
encrypted data. Then, we present security definition and the Paillier cryptosystem along with its additive homomorphic
properties. For ease of presentation, some common notations used throughout this paper are summarized in Table 1.
At first, it seems fully homomorphic cryptosystems (e.g., [24]) can solve the DMED problem since it allows a
third-party (that hosts the encrypted data) to execute arbitrary functions over encrypted data without ever decrypting
them. However, we stress that such techniques are very expensive and their usage in practical applications have yet to
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Table 1: SOME COMMON NOTATIONS
Alice The data owner holding database D
〈Epk, Dsk〉 A pair of Paillier’s encryption and decryption
functions with (pk, sk) as public-secret key pair
D′ Attribute-wise encryption of D
Bob An authorized user who can access D′ in the cloud
q Bob’s input query
n Number of data records in D
m Number of attributes in D
w Number of unique class labels in D
l Domain size (in bits) of the Squared Euclidean
distance based on D
〈z1, zl〉 The least and most significant bits of integer z
[z] Vector of encryptions of the individual bits of z
cq The class label corresponding to q based on D
be explored. For example, it was shown in [25] that even for weak security parameters one “bootstrapping” operation
of the homomorphic operation would take at least 30 seconds on a high performance machine.
Due to the above reason, we usually need at least two parties to perform arbitrary computations over encrypted data
based on an additive homomorphic encryption scheme. It is also possible to use the existing secret sharing techniques
in SMC, such as Shamir’s scheme [51], to develop a PPkNN protocol. However, our work is different from the secret
sharing based solution from the following two aspects. (i) Solutions based on the secret sharing schemes require at
least three parties whereas our work require only two parties. (ii) Hiding data access patterns is still an unsolved
problem in the secret sharing based schemes, whereas our work protects data access patterns from both participating
parties, and it can be extended into a solution under the secret sharing schemes. For example, the constructions based
on Sharemind [8], a well-known SMC framework which is based on the secret sharing scheme, assumes that the
number of participating parties is three. Thus, our work is orthogonal to Sharemind and other secret sharing based
schemes. Therefore, for the rest of this paper, we omit the discussion related to the techniques that can be constructed
using fully homomorphic cryptosystems or secret sharing schemes.
2.1 Privacy-Preserving Data Mining (PPDM)
Privacy Preserving Data Mining (PPDM) is defined as the process of extracting/deriving the knowledge about data
without compromising the privacy of data [3, 41, 48]. In the past decade, many privacy-preserving classification
techniques have been proposed in the literature in order to protect user privacy. Agrawal and Srikant [3], Lindell
and Pinkas [40] introduced the notion of privacy-preserving under data mining applications. In particular to privacy-
preserving classification, the goal is to build a classifier in order to predict the class label of input data record based on
the distributed training dataset without compromising the privacy of data.
1. Data Perturbation Methods: In these methods, values of individual data records are perturbed by adding random
noise in a such way that the distribution of perturbed data look very different from that of actual data. After such a
transformation, the perturbed data is sent to the miner to perform the desired data mining tasks. Agrawal and Srikant [3]
proposed the first data perturbation technique to build a decision-tree classifier. Since then many other randomization-
based methods have been proposed in the literature such as [5,21,22,44,58]. However, as mentioned earlier in Section
1, data perturbation techniques cannot be applicable for semantically secure encrypted data. Also, they do not produce
accurate data mining results due to the addition of statistical noises to the data.
2. Data Distribution Methods: These methods assume the dataset is partitioned either horizontally or vertically
and distributed across different parties. The parties later can collaborate to securely mine the combined data and learn
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the global data mining results. During this process, data owned by individual parties is not revealed to other parties.
This approach was first introduced by Lindell and Pinkas [40] who proposed a decision tree classifier under two-party
setting. Since then much work has been published using secure multiparty computation techniques [1, 15, 33, 37, 55].
Classification is one important task in many applications of data mining such as health-care and business. Recently,
performing data mining in the cloud attracted significant attention. In cloud computing, data owner outsources his/her
data to the cloud. However, from user’s perspective, privacy becomes an important issue when sensitive data needs
to be outsourced to the cloud. The direct way to guard the outsourced data is to apply encryption on the data before
outsourcing.
Unfortunately, since the hosted data on the cloud is in encrypted form in our problem domain, the existing privacy
preserving classification techniques are not sufficient and applicable to PPkNN due to the following reasons. (i) In
existing methods, the data are partitioned among at least two parties, whereas in our case encrypted data are hosted on
the cloud. (ii) Since some amount of information is loss due to the addition of statistical noises in order to hide the
sensitive attributes, the existing methods are not accurate. (iii) Leakage of data access patterns: the cloud can easily
derive useful and sensitive information about users’ data items by simply observing the database access patterns.
For the same reasons, in this paper, we do not consider secure k-nearest neighbor techniques in which the data are
distributed between two parties (e.g., [47]).
2.2 Query processing over encrypted data
Using encryption as a way to achieve the data confidentiality may cause another issue at the cloud during the query
evaluation. The question here is “how can the cloud perform computations over encrypted data while the data stored
are in encrypted form?” Along this direction, various techniques related to query processing over encrypted data have
been proposed, e.g., [2, 30, 32]. However, we observe that PPkNN is a more complex problem than the execution of
simple kNN queries over encrypted data [53, 54]. For one, the intermediate k-nearest neighbors in the classification
process, should not be disclosed to the cloud or any users. We emphasize that the recent method in [54] reveals the
k-nearest neighbors to the user. Secondly, even if we know the k-nearest neighbors, it is still very difficult to find
the majority class label among these neighbors since they are encrypted at the first place to prevent the cloud from
learning sensitive information. Third, the existing work did not addressed the access pattern issue which is a crucial
privacy requirement from the user’s perspective.
In our most recent work [20], we proposed a novel secure k-nearest neighbor query protocol over encrypted data
that protects data confidentiality, user’s query privacy, and hides data access patterns. However, as mentioned above,
PPkNN is a more complex problem and it cannot be solved directly using the existing secure k-nearest neighbor
techniques over encrypted data. Therefore, in this paper, we extend our previous work in [20] and provide a new
solution to the PPkNN classifier problem over encrypted data.
More specifically, this paper is different from our preliminary work [20] in the following four aspects. First, in this
paper, we introduced new security primitives, namely secure minimum (SMIN), secure minimum out of n numbers
(SMINn), secure frequency (SF), and proposed new solutions for them. Second, the work in [20] did not provide
any formal security analysis of the underlying sub-protocols. On the other hand, this paper provides formal security
proofs of the underlying sub-protocols as well as the PPkNN protocol under the semi-honest model. Additionally,
we demonstrate various techniques through which the proposed protocol can possibly be extended to a protocol that
is secure under the malicious model. Third, our preliminary work in [20] addresses only secure kNN query which is
similar to Stage 1 of PPkNN. However, Stage 2 in PPkNN is entirely new. Finally, our empirical analyses in Section
VI are based on a real dataset whereas the results in [20] are based on a simulated dataset. In addition, new results are
included in this paper.
As mentioned earlier, one can implement the proposed protocols under secret sharing schemes. By doing so, we
need to have at least three independent parties. In this work, we only concentrate on the two party situation; thus, we
adopted the Paillier cryptosystem. Two-party and multi-party (three or more parties) SMC protocols are complement
to each other, and their applications mainly depend on the number of available participants. In practice, two mutually
independent clouds are easier to find and are cheaper to operate. On the other hand, utilizing three cloud servers and
secret sharing schemes to implement the proposed protocols may result more efficient running time. We believe both
two-party and multi-party schemes are important. As a future work, we will consider secret sharing based PPkNN
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implementations.
2.3 Threat Model
In this paper, privacy/security is closely related to the amount of information disclosed during the execution of a
protocol. In the proposed protocols, our goal is to ensure no information leakage to the involved parties other than what
they can deduce from their own outputs. There are many ways to define information disclosure. To maximize privacy
or minimize information disclosure, we adopt the security definitions in the literature of secure multiparty computation
(SMC) first introduced by Yao’s Millionaires’ problem for which a provably secure solution was developed [56, 57].
This was extended to multiparty computations by Goldreich et al. [28]. It was proved in [28] that any computation
which can be done in polynomial time by a single party can also be done securely by multiple parties. Since then
much work has been published for the multiparty case (e.g., [6, 7, 12, 13, 16, 26, 38, 39]).
There are three common adversarial models under SMC: semi-honest, covert and malicious. An adversarial model
generally specifies what an adversary or attacker is allowed to do during an execution of a secure protocol. In the
semi-honest model, an attacker (i.e., one of the participating parties) is expected to follow the prescribed steps of a
protocol. However, the attacker can compute any additional information based on his or her private input, output and
messages received during an execution of the secure protocol. As a result, whatever can be inferred from the private
input and output of an attacker is not considered as a privacy violation. An adversary in the semi-honest model can
be treated as a passive attacker whereas an adversary in the malicious model can be treated as an active attacker who
can arbitrarily diverge from the normal execution of a protocol. On the other hand, the covert adversary model [4] lies
between the semi-honest and malicious models. More specifically, an adversary under the covert model may deviate
arbitrarily from the rules of a protocol, however, in the case of cheating, the honest party is guaranteed to detect this
cheating with good probability.
In this paper, to develop secure and efficient protocols, we assume that parties are semi-honest for two reasons.
First, as mentioned in [35], developing protocols under the semi-honest setting is an important first step towards
constructing protocols with stronger security guarantees. Second, it is worth pointing out that all the practical SMC
protocols proposed in the literature (e.g., [31, 34, 35, 43]) are implemented only under the semi-honest model. By
semi-honest model, we implicitly assume that the cloud service providers (or other participating users) utilized in our
protocols do not collude. Since current known cloud service providers are well established IT companies, it is hard
to see the possibility for two companies, e.g., Google and Amazon, to collude as it will damage their reputations
and consequently place negative impact on their revenues. Thus, in our problem domain, assuming the participating
parties are semi-honest is very realistic. Detailed security definitions and models can be found in [26, 27]. Briefly, the
following definition captures the above discussion regarding a secure protocol under the semi-honest model.
Definition 1 Let ai be the input of party Pi, Πi(pi) be Pi’s execution image of the protocol pi and bi be the output for
party Pi computed from pi. Then, pi is secure if Πi(pi) can be simulated from ai and bi such that distribution of the
simulated image is computationally indistinguishable from Πi(pi).
In the above definition, an execution image generally includes the input, the output and the messages communi-
cated during an execution of a protocol. To prove a protocol is secure under semi-honest model, we generally need to
show that the execution image of a protocol does not leak any information regarding the private inputs of participating
parties [26]. In this paper, we first propose a PPkNN protocol that is secure under the semi-honest model. We then
extend it to be secure under other adversarial models.
2.4 Paillier Cryptosystem
The Paillier cryptosystem is an additive homomorphic and probabilistic asymmetric encryption scheme whose security
is based on the Decisional Composite Residuosity Assumption [45]. Let Epk be the encryption function with public
key pk given by (N, g) and Dsk be the decryption function with secret key sk given by a trapdoor function λ (that is,
the knowledge of the factors of N ). Here, N is the RSA modulus of bit length K and generator g ∈ Z∗N2 . For any
given a, b ∈ ZN , the Paillier encryption scheme exhibits the following properties:
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a. Homomorphic Addition
Dsk(Epk(a+ b)) = Dsk(Epk(a) ∗ Epk(b) mod N
2)
b. Homomorphic Multiplication
Dsk(Epk(a ∗ b)) = Dsk(Epk(a)
b mod N2)
c. Semantic Security - The encryption scheme is semantically secure [26, 29]. Briefly, given a set of ciphertexts, an
adversary cannot deduce any additional information regarding the corresponding plaintexts.
In this paper, we assume that a data owner encrypted his or her data using Paillier cryptosystem before outsourcing
to a cloud. However, we stress that any other additive homomorphic public-key cryptosystem satisfying the above
properties can also be used to implement our proposed protocol. We simply use the well-known Paillier’s scheme in
our implementations. Also, for ease of presentation, we drop the mod N2 term during the homomorphic operations
in the rest of this paper. In addition, many extensions to the Paillier cryptosystem have been proposed in the literature
[17, 18, 23]. However, to be more specific, in this paper we use the original Paillier cryptosystem [45]. Nevertheless,
our work can be directly applied to the above mentioned extensions of the Paillier’s scheme.
3 Privacy-Preserving Protocols
In this section, we present a set of generic sub-protocols that will be used in constructing our proposed k-NN protocol
in Section 5. All of the below protocols are considered under two-party semi-honest setting. In particular, we assume
the exist of two semi-honest parties P1 and P2 such that the Paillier’s secret key sk is known only to P2 whereas pk is
treated as public.
• Secure Multiplication (SM) Protocol:
This protocol considers P1 with input (Epk(a), Epk(b)) and outputs Epk(a ∗ b) to P1, where a and b are not
known to P1 and P2. During this process, no information regarding a and b is revealed to P1 and P2.
• Secure Squared Euclidean Distance (SSED) Protocol:
In this protocol, P1 with input (Epk(X), Epk(Y )) and P2 with sk securely compute the encryption of squared
Euclidean distance between vectors X and Y . Here X and Y are m dimensional vectors where Epk(X) =
〈Epk(x1), . . . , Epk(xm)〉 andEpk(Y ) = 〈Epk(y1), . . . , Epk(ym)〉. The output of the SSED protocol isEpk(|X−
Y |2) which is known only to P1.
• Secure Bit-Decomposition (SBD) Protocol:
P1 with input Epk(z) and P2 securely compute the encryptions of the individual bits of z, where 0 ≤ z < 2l.
The output [z] = 〈Epk(z1), . . . , Epk(zl)〉 is known only to P1. Here z1 and zl are the most and least significant
bits of integer z, respectively.
• Secure Minimum (SMIN) Protocol:
In this protocol,P1 holds private input (u′, v′) andP2 holds sk, whereu′ = ([u], Epk(su)) and v′ = ([v], Epk(sv)).
Here su (resp., sv) denotes the secret associated with u (resp., v). The goal of SMIN is for P1 and P2 to jointly
compute the encryptions of the individual bits of minimum number between u and v. In addition, they compute
Epk(smin(u,v)). That is, the output is ([min(u, v)], Epk(smin(u,v))) which will be known only to P1. During
this protocol, no information regarding the contents of u, v, su, and sv is revealed to P1 and P2.
• Secure Minimum out of n Numbers (SMINn) Protocol:
In this protocol, we consider P1 with n encrypted vectors ([d1], . . . , [dn]) along with their respective encrypted
secrets and P2 with sk. Here [di] = 〈Epk(di,1), . . . , Epk(di,l)〉 where di,1 and di,l are the most and least sig-
nificant bits of integer di respectively, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. The secret of di is given by sdi . P1 and P2 jointly
compute [min(d1, . . . , dn)]. In addition, they compute Epk(smin(d1,...,dn)). At the end of this protocol, the out-
put ([min(d1, . . . , dn)], Epk(smin(d1,...,dn))) is known only to P1. During the SMINn protocol, no information
regarding any of di’s and their secrets is revealed to P1 and P2.
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Algorithm 1 SM(Epk(a), Epk(b))→ Epk(a ∗ b)
Require: P1 has Epk(a) and Epk(b); P2 has sk
1: P1:
(a). Pick two random numbers ra, rb ∈ ZN
(b). a′ ← Epk(a) ∗ Epk(ra)
(c). b′ ← Epk(b) ∗ Epk(rb); send a′, b′ to P2
2: P2:
(a). Receive a′ and b′ from P1
(b). ha ← Dsk(a′); hb ← Dsk(b′)
(c). h← ha ∗ hb mod N
(d). h′ ← Epk(h); send h′ to P1
3: P1:
(a). Receive h′ from P2
(b). s← h′ ∗ Epk(a)N−rb
(c). s′ ← s ∗ Epk(b)N−ra
(d). Epk(a ∗ b)← s′ ∗ Epk(ra ∗ rb)N−1
• Secure Bit-OR (SBOR) Protocol:
P1 with input (Epk(o1), Epk(o2)) and P2 securely compute Epk(o1 ∨ o2), where o1 and o2 are two bits. The
output Epk(o1 ∨ o2) is known only to P1.
• Secure Frequency (SF) Protocol:
In this protocol, P1 with private input (〈Epk(c1), . . . Epk(cw)〉, 〈Epk(c′1), . . . , Epk(c′k)〉) and P2 securely com-
pute the encryption of the frequency of cj , denoted by f(cj), in the list 〈c′1, . . . , c′k〉, for 1 ≤ j ≤ w. We explic-
itly assume that cj’s are unique and c′i ∈ {c1, . . . , cw}, for 1 ≤ i ≤ k. The output 〈Epk(f(c1)), . . . , Epk(f(cw))〉
will be known only to P1. During the SF protocol, no information regarding c′i, cj , and f(cj) is revealed to P1
and P2, for 1 ≤ i ≤ k and 1 ≤ j ≤ w.
Now we either propose a new solution or refer to the most efficient known implementation to each of the above pro-
tocols. First of all, efficient solutions to SM, SSED, SBD and SBOR were presented in our preliminary work [20].
However, for completeness, we briefly discuss those solutions here. Also, we discuss SMIN, SMINn, and SF problems
in detail and propose new solutions to each one of them.
Secure Multiplication (SM). Consider a party P1 with private input (Epk(a), Epk(b)) and a party P2 with the secret
key sk. The goal of the secure multiplication (SM) protocol is to return the encryption of a ∗ b, i.e., Epk(a ∗ b) as
output to P1. During this protocol, no information regarding a and b is revealed to P1 and P2. The basic idea of the
SM protocol is based on the following property which holds for any given a, b ∈ ZN :
a ∗ b = (a+ ra) ∗ (b+ rb)− a ∗ rb − b ∗ ra − ra ∗ rb (1)
where all the arithmetic operations are performed under ZN . The overall steps in SM are shown in Algorithm 1.
Briefly, P1 initially randomizes a and b by computing a′ = Epk(a) ∗ Epk(ra) and b′ = Epk(b) ∗ Epk(rb), and sends
them to P2. Here ra and rb are random numbers in ZN known only to P1. Upon receiving, P2 decrypts and multiplies
them to get h = (a + ra) ∗ (b + rb) mod N . Then, P2 encrypts h and sends it to P1. After this, P1 removes extra
random factors from h′ = Epk((a + ra) ∗ (b + rb)) based on Equation 1 to get Epk(a ∗ b). Note that, under Paillier
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Algorithm 2 SSED(Epk(X), Epk(Y ))→ Epk(|X − Y |2)
Require: P1 has Epk(X) and Epk(Y ); P2 has sk
1: P1, for 1 ≤ i ≤ m do:
(a). Epk(xi − yi)← Epk(xi) ∗ Epk(yi)N−1
2: P1 and P2, for 1 ≤ i ≤ m do:
(a). Compute Epk((xi − yi)2) using the SM protocol
3: P1:
(a). Epk(|X − Y |2)←
∏m
i=1Epk((xi − yi)
2)
cryptosystem, “N − x” is equivalent to “−x” in ZN . Hereafter, we use the notation r ∈R ZN to denote r as a random
number in ZN .
Example 2 Let us assume that a = 59 and b = 58. For simplicity, let ra = 1 and rb = 3. Initially, P1 computes
a′ = Epk(60) = Epk(a) ∗ Epk(ra), b
′ = Epk(61) = Epk(b) ∗ Epk(rb) and sends them to P2. Then, P2 decrypts and
multiplies them to get h = 3660. After this, P2 encrypts h to get h′ = Epk(3660) and sends it to P1. Upon receiving
h′, P1 computes s = Epk(3483) = Epk(3660 − a ∗ rb), and s′ = Epk(3425) = Epk(3483 − b ∗ ra). Finally, P1
computes Epk(a ∗ b) = Epk(3422) = Epk(3425− ra ∗ rb). 
Secure Squared Euclidean Distance (SSED). In the SSED protocol,P1 holds two encrypted vectors (Epk(X), Epk(Y ))
andP2 holds the secret key sk. HereX and Y are twom-dimensional vectors whereEpk(X) = 〈Epk(x1), . . . , Epk(xm)〉
andEpk(Y ) = 〈Epk(y1), . . . , Epk(ym)〉. The goal of the SSED protocol is to securely computeEpk(|X−Y |2), where
|X − Y | denotes the Euclidean distance between vectors X and Y . At a high level, the basic idea of SSED follows
from following equation:
|X − Y |2 =
m∑
i=1
(xi − yi)
2 (2)
The main steps involved in the SSED protocol are as shown in Algorithm 2. Briefly, for 1 ≤ i ≤ m, P1 initially
computes Epk(xi − yi) by using the homomorphic properties. Then P1 and P2 jointly compute Epk((xi − yi)2)
using the SM protocol, for 1 ≤ i ≤ m. Note that the outputs of SM are known only to P1. Finally, by applying
homomorphic properties on Epk((xi − yi)2), P1 computes Epk(|X − Y |2) locally based on Equation 2.
Example 3 Let us assume thatP1 holds the encrypted data records ofX and Y given byEpk(X) = 〈Epk(63), Epk(1),
Epk(1), Epk(145), Epk(233), Epk(1), Epk(3), Epk(0), Epk(6), Epk(0)〉 and Epk(Y ) = 〈Epk(56), Epk(1), Epk(3),
Epk(130), Epk(256), Epk(1), Epk(2), Epk(1), Epk(6), Epk(2)〉. During the SSED protocol, P1 initially computes
Epk(x1 − y1) = Epk(7), . . . , Epk(x10 − y10) = Epk(−2). Then, P1 and P2 jointly compute Epk((x1 − y1)2) =
Epk(49) = SM(Epk(7), Epk(7)), . . . , Epk((x10 − y10)
2) = SM(Epk(−2), Epk(−2)) = Epk(4). P1 locally com-
putes Epk(|X − Y |2) = Epk(
∑10
i=1(xi − yi)
2) = Epk(813). 
Secure Bit-Decomposition (SBD). We assume that P1 has Epk(z) and P2 has sk, where z is not known to both
parties and 0 ≤ z < 2l. Given Epk(z), the goal of the secure bit-decomposition (SBD) protocol is to compute the
encryptions of the individual bits of binary representation of z. That is, the output is [z] = 〈Epk(z1), . . . , Epk(zl)〉,
where z1 and zl denote the most and least significant bits of z respectively. At the end, the output [z] is known only to
P1. During this process, neither the value of z nor any zi’s is revealed to P1 and P2.
Since the goal of this paper is not to investigate existing SBD protocols, we simply use the most efficient SBD
protocol that was recently proposed in [50].
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Example 4 Let us assume that z = 55 and l = 6. Then the SBD protocol in [50] with private input Epk(55) returns
[55] = 〈Epk(1), Epk(1), Epk(0), Epk(1), Epk(1), Epk(1)〉 as the output to P1. 
Secure Minimum (SMIN). In this protocol, we assume that P1 holds private input (u′, v′) and P2 holds sk, where
u′ = ([u], Epk(su)) and v′ = ([v], Epk(sv)). Here su and sv denote the secrets corresponding to u and v, respec-
tively. The main goal of SMIN is to securely compute the encryptions of the individual bits of min(u, v), denoted
by [min(u, v)]. Here [u] = 〈Epk(u1), . . . , Epk(ul)〉 and [v] = 〈Epk(v1), . . . , Epk(vl)〉, where u1 (resp., v1) and ul
(resp., vl) are the most and least significant bits of u (resp., v), respectively. In addition, they computeEpk(smin(u,v)),
the encryption of the secret corresponding to the minimum value between u and v. At the end of SMIN, the output
([min(u, v)], Epk(smin(u,v))) is known only to P1.
We assume that 0 ≤ u, v < 2l and propose a novel SMIN protocol. Our solution to SMIN is mainly motivated
from the work of [20]. Precisely, the basic idea of the proposed SMIN protocol is for P1 to randomly choose the
functionality F (by flipping a coin), where F is either u > v or v > u, and to obliviously execute F with P2. Since F
is randomly chosen and known only to P1, the result of the functionalityF is oblivious to P2. Based on the comparison
result and chosen F , P1 computes [min(u, v)] and Epk(smin(u,v)) locally using homomorphic properties.
The overall steps involved in the SMIN protocol are shown in Algorithm 3. To start with, P1 initially chooses the
functionality F as either u > v or v > u randomly. Then, using the SM protocol, P1 computes Epk(ui ∗ vi) with the
help of P2, for 1 ≤ i ≤ l. After this, the protocol has the following key steps, performed by P1 locally, for 1 ≤ i ≤ l:
• Compute the encrypted bit-wise XOR between the bits ui and vi as Ti = Epk(ui ⊕ vi) using the below formu-
lation1:
Ti = Epk(ui) ∗ Epk(vi) ∗ Epk(ui ∗ vi)
N−2
• Compute an encrypted vector H by preserving the first occurrence of Epk(1) (if there exists one) in T by
initializing H0 = Epk(0). The rest of the entries of H are computed as Hi = Hrii−1 ∗ Ti. We emphasize that at
most one of the entry in H is Epk(1) and the remaining entries are encryptions of either 0 or a random number.
• Then, P1 computes Φi = Epk(−1) ∗ Hi. Note that “−1” is equivalent to “N − 1” under ZN . From the
above discussions, it is clear that Φi = Epk(0) at most once since Hi is equal to Epk(1) at most once. Also,
if Φj = Epk(0), then index j is the position at which the bits of u and v differ first (starting from the most
significant bit position).
Now, depending on F , P1 creates two encrypted vectors W and Γ as follows, for 1 ≤ i ≤ l:
• If F : u > v, compute
Wi = Epk(ui) ∗ Epk(ui ∗ vi)
N−1
= Epk(ui ∗ (1− vi))
Γi = Epk(vi − ui) ∗ Epk(rˆi)
= Epk(vi − ui + rˆi)
• If F : v > u, compute:
Wi = Epk(vi) ∗ Epk(ui ∗ vi)
N−1
= Epk(vi ∗ (1 − ui))
Γi = Epk(ui − vi) ∗ Epk(rˆi)
= Epk(ui − vi + rˆi)
1In general, for any two given bits o1 and o2, the property o1 ⊕ o2 = o1 + o2 − 2(o1 ∗ o2) always hold.
10
Algorithm 3 SMIN(u′, v′)→ ([min(u, v)], Epk(smin(u,v)))
Require: P1 has u′ = ([u], Epk(su)) and v′ = ([v], Epk(sv)), where 0 ≤ u, v < 2l; P2 has sk
1: P1:
(a). Randomly choose the functionality F
(b). for i = 1 to l do:
• Epk(ui ∗ vi)← SM(Epk(ui), Epk(vi))
• Ti ← Epk(ui ⊕ vi)
• Hi ← H
ri
i−1 ∗ Ti; ri ∈R ZN and H0 = Epk(0)
• Φi ← Epk(−1) ∗Hi
• if F : u > v then Wi ← Epk(ui) ∗ Epk(ui ∗ vi)N−1 and Γi ← Epk(vi − ui) ∗ Epk(rˆi); rˆi ∈R ZN
else Wi ← Epk(vi) ∗ Epk(ui ∗ vi)N−1 and Γi ← Epk(ui − vi) ∗ Epk(rˆi); rˆi ∈R ZN
• Li ← Wi ∗ Φ
r′i
i ; r
′
i ∈R ZN
(c). if F : u > v then: δ ← Epk(sv − su) ∗ Epk(r¯)
else δ ← Epk(su − sv) ∗ Epk(r¯), where r¯ ∈R ZN
(d). Γ′ ← pi1(Γ) and L′ ← pi2(L)
(e). Send δ,Γ′ and L′ to P2
2: P2:
(a). Decryption: Mi ← Dsk(L′i), for 1 ≤ i ≤ l
(b). if ∃ j such that Mj = 1 then α← 1
else α← 0
(c). if α = 0 then:
• M ′i ← Epk(0), for 1 ≤ i ≤ l
• δ′ ← Epk(0)
else
• M ′i ← Γ
′
i ∗ r
N
, where r ∈R ZN and is different for 1 ≤ i ≤ l
• δ′ ← δ ∗ rNδ , where rδ ∈R ZN
(d). Send M ′, Epk(α) and δ′ to P1
3: P1:
(a). M˜ ← pi−11 (M ′) and θ ← δ′ ∗ Epk(α)N−r¯
(b). λi ← M˜i ∗Epk(α)N−rˆi , for 1 ≤ i ≤ l
(c). if F : u > v then:
• Epk(smin(u,v))← Epk(su) ∗ θ
• Epk(min(u, v)i)← Epk(ui) ∗ λi, for 1 ≤ i ≤ l
else
• Epk(smin(u,v))← Epk(sv) ∗ θ
• Epk(min(u, v)i)← Epk(vi) ∗ λi, for 1 ≤ i ≤ l
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Table 2: P1 chooses F as v > u where u = 55 and v = 58 (Note: All column values are in encrypted form except
Mi column. Also, r ∈R ZN is different for each row and column. )
[u] [v] Wi Γi Gi Hi Φi Li Γi’ L
′
i Mi λi mini
1 1 0 r 0 0 −1 r 1 + r r r 0 1
1 1 0 r 0 0 −1 r r r r 0 1
0 1 1 −1 + r 1 1 0 1 1 + r r r −1 0
1 0 0 1 + r 1 r r r −1 + r r r 1 1
1 1 0 r 0 r r r r 1 1 0 1
1 0 0 1 + r 1 r r r r r r 1 1
where rˆi is a random number in ZN . The observation here is if F : u > v, then Wi = Epk(1) iff ui > vi, and
Wi = Epk(0) otherwise. Similarly, when F : v > u, we have Wi = Epk(1) iff vi > ui, and Wi = Epk(0) otherwise.
Also, depending of F , Γi stores the encryption of randomized difference between ui and vi which will be used in later
computations.
After this, P1 computes L by combining Φ and W . More precisely, P1 computes Li = Wi ∗ Φr
′
i
i , where r′i is a
random number in ZN . The observation here is if ∃ an index j such that Φj = Epk(0), denoting the first flip in the bits
of u and v, thenWj stores the corresponding desired information, i.e., whether uj > vj or vj > uj in encrypted form.
In addition, depending on F , P1 computes the encryption of randomized difference between su and sv and stores it in
δ. Specifically, if F : u > v, then δ = Epk(sv − su + r¯). Otherwise, δ = Epk(su − sv + r¯), where r¯ ∈R ZN .
After this, P1 permutes the encrypted vectors Γ and L using two random permutation functions pi1 and pi2. Specif-
ically, P1 computes Γ′ = pi1(Γ) and L′ = pi2(L), and sends them along with δ to P2. Upon receiving, P2 decrypts L′
component-wise to get Mi = Dsk(L′i), for 1 ≤ i ≤ l, and checks for index j. That is, if Mj = 1, then P2 sets α to 1,
otherwise sets it to 0. In addition, P2 computes a new encrypted vector M ′ depending on the value of α. Precisely, if
α = 0, then M ′i = Epk(0), for 1 ≤ i ≤ l. Here Epk(0) is different for each i. On the other hand, when α = 1, P2 sets
M ′i to the re-randomized value of Γ′i. That is, M ′i = Γ′i ∗ rN , where the term rN comes from re-randomization and
r ∈R ZN should be different for each i. Furthermore, P2 computes δ′ = Epk(0) if α = 0. However, when α = 1,
P2 sets δ′ to δ ∗ rNδ , where rδ is a random number in ZN . Then, P2 sends M ′, Epk(α) and δ′ to P1. After receiving
M ′, Epk(α) and δ′, P1 computes the inverse permutation of M ′ as M˜ = pi−11 (M ′). Then, P1 performs the following
homomorphic operations to compute the encryption of ith bit of min(u, v), i.e., Epk(min(u, v)i), for 1 ≤ i ≤ l:
• Remove the randomness from M˜i by computing λi = M˜i ∗ Epk(α)N−rˆi
• If F : u > v, compute the ith encrypted bit of min(u, v) as Epk(min(u, v)i) = Epk(ui) ∗ λi = Epk(ui + α ∗
(vi − ui)). Otherwise, compute Epk(min(u, v)i) = Epk(vi) ∗ λi = Epk(vi + α ∗ (ui − vi)).
Also, depending on F , P1 computes Epk(smin(u,v)) as follows. If F : u > v, P1 computes Epk(smin(u,v)) =
Epk(su) ∗ θ, where θ = δ′ ∗ Epk(α)N−r¯ . Otherwise, he/she computes Epk(smin(u,v)) = Epk(sv) ∗ θ.
In the SMIN protocol, one main observation (upon which we can also justify the correctness of the final output)
is that if F : u > v, then min(u, v)i = (1 − α) ∗ ui + α ∗ vi always holds, for 1 ≤ i ≤ l. On the other hand, if
F : v > u, then min(u, v)i = α ∗ ui + (1 − α) ∗ vi always holds. Similar conclusions can be drawn for smin(u,v).
We emphasize that using similar formulations one can also design a SMAX protocol to compute [max(u, v)] and
Epk(smax(u,v)). Also, we stress that there can be multiple secrets of u and v that can be fed as input (in encrypted
form) to SMIN and SMAX. For example, let s1u and s2u (resp., s1v and s2v) be two secrets associated with u (resp., v).
Then the SMIN protocol takes ([u], Epk(s1u), Epk(s2u)) and ([v], Epk(s1v), Epk(s2v)) as P1’s private input and outputs
[min(u, v)], Epk(s
1
min(u,v)) and Epk(s2min(u,v)) to P1.
Example 5 For simplicity, consider that u = 55, v = 58, and l = 6. Suppose su and sv be the secrets associated
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Algorithm 4 SMINn(([d1], Epk(sd1)), . . . , ([dn], Epk(sdn)))→ ([dmin], Epk(sdmin))
Require: P1 has (([d1], Epk(sd1)), . . . , ([dn], Epk(sdn))); P2 has sk
1: P1:
(a). [d′i]← [di] and s′i ← Epk(sdi), for 1 ≤ i ≤ n
(b). num← n
2: for i = 1 to ⌈log2 n⌉:
(a). for 1 ≤ j ≤ ⌊num2
⌋
:
• if i = 1 then:
– ([d′2j−1], s
′
2j−1)← SMIN(x, y), where x = ([d′2j−1], s′2j−1) and y = ([d′2j ], s′2j)
– [d′2j ]← 0 and s′2j ← 0
else
– ([d′2i(j−1)+1], s
′
2i(j−1)+1) ← SMIN(x, y), where x = ([d′2i(j−1)+1], s′2i(j−1)+1) and y =
([d′2ij−1], s
′
2ij−1)
– [d′2ij−1]← 0 and s′2ij−1 ← 0
(b). num← ⌈num2
⌉
3: P1: [dmin]← [d′1] and Epk(sdmin)← s′1
with u and v, respectively. Assume that P1 holds ([55], Epk(su)) ([58], Epk(sv)). In addition, we assume that P1’s
random permutation functions are as given below.
i = 1 2 3 4 5 6
↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓
pi1(i) = 6 5 4 3 2 1
pi2(i) = 2 1 5 6 3 4
Without loss of generality, suppose P1 chooses the functionality F : v > u. Then, various intermediate results
based on the SMIN protocol are as shown in Table 2. Following from Table 2, we observe that:
• At most one of the entry in H is Epk(1), namely H3, and the remaining entries are encryptions of either 0 or a
random number in ZN .
• Index j = 3 is the first position at which the corresponding bits of u and v differ.
• Φ3 = Epk(0) since H3 is equal to Epk(1). Also, since M5 = 1, P2 sets α to 1.
• In addition, Epk(smin(u,v)) = Epk(α ∗ su + (1− α) ∗ sv) = Epk(su).
At the end of SMIN, only P1 knows [min(u, v)] = [u] = [55] and Epk(smin(u,v)) = Epk(su). 
Secure Minimum out of n Numbers (SMINn). Consider P1 with private input ([d1], . . . , [dn]) along with their
encrypted secrets and P2 with sk, where 0 ≤ di < 2l and [di] = 〈Epk(di,1), . . . , Epk(di,l)〉, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
13
[dmin] ← [d
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Figure 1: Binary execution tree for n = 6 based on SMINn
Here the secret of di is denoted by Epk(sdi), for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. The main goal of the SMINn protocol is to compute
[min(d1, . . . , dn)] = [dmin] without revealing any information about di’s to P1 and P2. In addition, they compute
the encryption of the secret corresponding to the global minimum, denoted by Epk(sdmin). Here we construct a new
SMINn protocol by utilizing SMIN as the building block. The proposed SMINn protocol is an iterative approach and
it computes the desired output in an hierarchical fashion. In each iteration, minimum between a pair of values and the
secret corresponding to the minimum value are computed (in encrypted form) and fed as input to the next iteration,
thus, generating a binary execution tree in a bottom-up fashion. At the end, only P1 knows the final result [dmin] and
Epk(sdmin).
The overall steps involved in the proposed SMINn protocol are highlighted in Algorithm 4. Initially, P1 assigns
[di] and Epk(sdi) to a temporary vector [d′i] and variable s′i, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, respectively. Also, he/she creates
a global variable num and initializes it to n, where num represents the number of (non-zero) vectors involved in
each iteration. Since the SMINn protocol executes in a binary tree hierarchy (bottom-up fashion), we have ⌈log2 n⌉
iterations, and in each iteration, the number of vectors involved varies. In the first iteration (i.e., i = 1), P1 with
private input (([d′2j−1], s′2j−1), ([d′2j ], s′2j)) and P2 with sk involve in the SMIN protocol, for 1 ≤ j ≤
⌊
num
2
⌋
. At
the end of the first iteration, only P1 knows [min(d′2j−1, d′2j)] and s′min(d′
2j−1
,d′
2j
), and nothing is revealed to P2, for
1 ≤ j ≤
⌊
num
2
⌋
. Also, P1 stores the result [min(d′2j−1, d′2j)] and s′min(d′
2j−1
,d′
2j
) in [d
′
2j−1] and s′2j−1, respectively.
In addition, P1 updates the values of [d′2j ], s′2j to 0 and num to
⌈
num
2
⌉
, respectively.
During the ith iteration, only the non-zero vectors (along with the corresponding encrypted secrets) are involved
in SMIN, for 2 ≤ i ≤ ⌈log2 n⌉. For example, during the second iteration (i.e., i = 2), only ([d′1], s′1), ([d′3], s′3), and
so on are involved. Note that in each iteration, the output is revealed only to P1 and num is updated to
⌈
num
2
⌉
. At the
end of SMINn, P1 assigns the final encrypted binary vector of global minimum value, i.e., [min(d1, . . . , dn)] which is
stored in [d′1], to [dmin]. In addition, P1 assigns s′1 to Epk(sdmin).
Example 6 Suppose P1 holds 〈[d1], . . . , [d6]〉 (i.e., n = 6). For simplicity, here we are assuming that there are no
secrets associated with di’s. Then, based on the SMINn protocol, the binary execution tree (in a bottom-up fashion) to
compute [min(d1, . . . , d6)] is shown in Figure 1. Note that, [d′i] is initially set to [di], for 1 ≤ i ≤ 6. 
Secure Bit-OR (SBOR). Suppose P1 holds (Epk(o1), Epk(o2)) and P2 holds sk, where o1 and o2 are two bits not
known to both parties. The goal of the SBOR protocol is to securely computeEpk(o1∨o2). At the end of this protocol,
only P1 knowsEpk(o1 ∨ o2). During this process, no information related to o1 and o2 is revealed to P1 and P2. Given
the secure multiplication (SM) protocol, P1 can compute Epk(o1 ∨ o2) as follows:
• P1 with input (Epk(o1), Epk(o2)) and P2 involve in the SM protocol. At the end of this step, the output
Epk(o1 ∗ o2) is known only to P1. Note that, since o1 and o2 are bits, Epk(o1 ∗ o2) = Epk(o1 ∧ o2).
• Epk(o1 ∨ o2) = Epk(o1 + o2) ∗ Epk(o1 ∧ o2)
N−1
.
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We emphasize that, for any given two bits o1 and o2, the property o1 ∨ o2 = o1 + o2 − o1 ∧ o2 always holds. Note
that, by homomorphic addition property,Epk(o1 + o2) = Epk(o1) ∗ Epk(o2).
Secure Frequency (SF). Consider a situation where P1 holds (〈Epk(c1), . . . , Epk(cw)〉, 〈Epk(c′1), . . . , Epk(c′k)〉)
and P2 holds the secret key sk. The goal of the SF protocol is to securely compute Epk(f(cj)), for 1 ≤ j ≤ w. Here
f(cj) denotes the number of times element cj occurs (i.e., frequency) in the list 〈c′1, . . . , c′k〉. We explicitly assume
that c′i ∈ {c1, . . . , cw}, for 1 ≤ i ≤ k.
The output 〈Epk(f(c1)), . . . , Epk(f(cw))〉 is revealed only to P1. During the SF protocol, neither c′i nor cj is
revealed to P1 and P2. Also, f(cj) is kept private from both P1 and P2, for 1 ≤ i ≤ k and 1 ≤ j ≤ w.
The overall steps involved in the proposed SF protocol are shown in Algorithm 5. To start with, P1 initially
computes an encrypted vector Si such that Si,j = Epk(cj − c′i), for 1 ≤ j ≤ w. Then, P1 randomizes Si component-
wise to get S′i,j = Epk(ri,j ∗ (cj − c′i)), where ri,j is a random number in ZN . After this, for 1 ≤ i ≤ k, P1 randomly
permutes S′i component-wise using a random permutation function pii (known only to P1). The output Zi ← pii(S′i)
is sent to P2. Upon receiving, P2 decrypts Zi component-wise, computes a vector ui and proceeds as follows:
• If Dsk(Zi,j) = 0, then ui,j is set to 1. Otherwise, ui,j is set to 0.
• The observation is, since c′i ∈ {c1, . . . , cw}, that exactly one of the entries in vector Zi is an encryption of 0 and
the rest are encryptions of random numbers. This further implies that exactly one of the decrypted values of Zi
is 0 and the rest are random numbers. Precisely, if ui,j = 1, then c′i = cpi−1(j).
• Compute Ui,j = Epk(ui,j) and send it to P1, for 1 ≤ i ≤ k and 1 ≤ j ≤ w.
Upon receiving U , P1 performs row-wise inverse permutation on it to get Vi = pi−1i (Ui), for 1 ≤ i ≤ k. Finally, P1
computes Epk(cj) =
∏k
i=1 Vi,j locally, for 1 ≤ j ≤ w.
4 Security Analysis of Privacy-Preserving Primitives under the Semi-Honest
Model
First of all, we emphasize that the outputs in the above mentioned protocols are always in encrypted format, and are
known only to P1. Also, all the intermediate results revealed to P2 are either random or pseudo-random. Note that,
the SBD protocol in [50] is secure under the semi-honest model. Therefore, here we provide security proofs for the
other protocols under the semi-honest model. Informally speaking, we claim that all the intermediate results seen by
P1 and P2 in the mentioned protocols are either random or pseudo-random.
As mentioned in Section 2.3, to formally prove that a protocol is secure [26] under the semi-honest model, we
need to show that the simulated execution image of that protocol is computationally indistinguishable from its actual
execution image. Remember that, an execution image generally includes the messages exchanged and the information
computed from these messages.
4.1 Proof of Security for SM
According to Algorithm 1, let the execution image of P2 be denoted by ΠP2(SM) which is given by ΠP2(SM) =
{〈a′, ha〉, 〈b
′, hb〉} where ha = a + ra mod N and hb = b + rb mod N are derived upon decrypting a′ and b′,
respectively. Note that ha and hb are random numbers in ZN . Suppose the simulated image of P2 be denoted by
ΠSP2(SM), where Π
S
P2
(SM) = {〈a∗, r′a〉, 〈b∗, r′b〉} Here a∗ and b∗ are randomly generated from ZN2 whereas r′a and
r′b are randomly generated from ZN . Since Epk is a semantically secure encryption scheme with resulting ciphertext
size less than N2, a′ and b′ are computationally indistinguishable from a∗ and b∗, respectively. Similarly, as ra and
rb are randomly chosen from ZN , ha and hb are computationally indistinguishable from r′a and r′b, respectively.
Combining the two results, we can conclude that ΠP2(SM) is computationally indistinguishable from ΠSP2(SM).
Similarly, the execution image of P1 in SM is given by ΠP1(SM) = {h′}. Here h′ is an encrypted value. Let the
simulated image of P1 be given by ΠSP1(SM) = {h
∗}, where h∗ is randomly chosen from ZN2 . Since Epk is a seman-
tically secure encryption scheme with resulting ciphertext size less than N2, h′ is computationally indistinguishable
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Algorithm 5 SF(Λ,Λ′)→ 〈Epk(f(c1)), . . . , Epk(f(cw))〉
Require: P1 has Λ = 〈Epk(c1), . . . , Epk(cw)〉, Λ′ = 〈Epk(c′1), . . . , Epk(c′k)〉 and 〈pi1, . . . , pik〉; P2 has sk
1: P1:
(a). for i = 1 to k do:
• Ti ← Epk(c
′
i)
N−1
• for j = 1 to w do:
– Si,j ← Epk(cj) ∗ Ti
– S′i,j ← Si,j
ri,j
, where ri,j ∈R ZN
• Zi ← pii(S
′
i)
(b). Send Z to P2
2: P2:
(a). Receive Z from P1
(b). for i = 1 to k do
• for j = 1 to w do:
– if Dsk(Zi,j) = 0 then ui,j ← 1
else ui,j ← 0
– Ui,j ← Epk(ui,j)
(c). Send U to P1
3: P1:
(a). Receive U from P2
(b). Vi ← pi−1i (Ui), for 1 ≤ i ≤ k
(c). Epk(f(cj))←
∏k
i=1 Vi,j , for 1 ≤ j ≤ w
from h∗. As a result, ΠP1(SM) is computationally indistinguishable from ΠSP1(SM). Putting the above results together
and following from Definition 1, we can claim that SM is secure under the semi-honest model.
4.2 Proof of Security for SSED
The security of SSED directly follows from SM which is used as the fundamental building block in SSED. This is
because, apart from SM, the rest of the steps in SSED are non-interactive. More specifically, as shown in Algorithm
2, P1 and P2 jointly compute Epk((xi − yi)2) using SM, for 1 ≤ i ≤ m. After this, P1 performs homomorphic
operations on Epk((xi − yi)2) locally (i.e., no interaction between P1 and P2).
4.3 Proof of Security for SMIN
According to Algorithm 3, let the execution image of P2 be denoted by ΠP2(SMIN), where
ΠP2(SMIN) = {〈δ, s+ r¯ mod N〉, 〈Γ′i, µi + rˆi mod N〉, 〈L′i, α〉}
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Observe that s + r¯ mod N and µi + rˆi mod N are derived upon decrypting δ and Γ′i, for 1 ≤ i ≤ l, respectively.
Note that the modulo operator is implicit in the decryption function. Also, P2 receives L′ from P1 and let α denote
the (oblivious) comparison result computed from L′. Without loss of generality, suppose the simulated image of P2
be ΠSP2(SMIN), where
ΠSP2(SMIN) = {〈δ
∗, r∗〉, 〈s′1,i, s
′
2,i〉, 〈s
′
3,i, α
′〉 | for 1 ≤ i ≤ l}
Here δ∗, s′1,i and s′3,i are randomly generated from ZN2 whereas r∗ and s′2,i are randomly generated from ZN . In
addition, α′ denotes a random bit. Since Epk is a semantically secure encryption scheme with resulting ciphertext
size less than N2, δ is computationally indistinguishable from δ∗. Similarly, Γ′i and L′i are computationally indis-
tinguishable from s′1,i and s′3,i, respectively. Also, as r¯ and rˆi are randomly generated from ZN , s + r¯ mod N and
µi + rˆi mod N are computationally indistinguishable from r∗ and s′2,i, respectively. Furthermore, because the func-
tionality is randomly chosen by P1 (at step 1(a) of Algorithm 3), α is either 0 or 1 with equal probability. Thus, α is
computationally indistinguishable from α′. Combining all these results together, we can conclude that ΠP2(SMIN) is
computationally indistinguishable from ΠSP2(SMIN) based on Definition 1. This implies that during the execution of
SMIN, P2 does not learn any information regarding u, v, su, sv and the actual comparison result. Intuitively speaking,
the information P2 has during an execution of SMIN is either random or pseudo-random, so this information does not
disclose anything regarding u, v, su and sv . Additionally, as F is known only to P1, the actual comparison result is
oblivious to P2.
On the other hand, the execution image of P1, denoted by ΠP1 (SMIN), is given by
ΠP1(SMIN) = {M ′i , Epk(α), δ′ | for 1 ≤ i ≤ l}
Here M ′i and δ′ are encrypted values, which are random in ZN2 , received from P2 (at step 3(a) of Algorithm 3). Let
the simulated image of P1 be ΠSP1(SMIN), where
ΠSP1 (SMIN) = {s
′
4,i, b
′, b′′ | for 1 ≤ i ≤ l}
The values s′4,i, b′ and b′′ are randomly generated from ZN2 . Since Epk is a semantically secure encryption scheme
with resulting ciphertext size less than N2, it implies that M ′i , Epk(α) and δ′ are computationally indistinguishable
from s4,i, b′ and b′′, respectively. Therefore,ΠP1(SMIN) is computationally indistinguishable fromΠSP1(SMIN) based
on Definition 1. As a result, P1 cannot learn any information regarding u, v, su, sv and the comparison result during
the execution of SMIN.
Based on the above analysis, we can say that the proposed SMIN protocol is secure under the semi-honest model
(following from Definition 1).
4.4 Proof of Security for SMINn
According to Algorithm 4, it is clear that SMINn uses the SMIN protocol as a building block in an iterative manner.
As proved above, SMIN is secure under the semi-honest model. Also, the output of SMIN which are passed as input to
the next iteration in SMINn are in encrypted format. Note that, SMINn is solely based on SMIN and there are no other
interactive steps between P1 and P2. Hence, by Composition Theorem [26], we claim that sequential combination of
SMIN routines lead to our SMINn protocol that guarantees security under the semi-honest model.
4.5 Proof of Security for SBOR
The security of SBOR depends solely on the underlying SM protocol. This is because, the only step at which P1 and
P2 interact in SBOR is during SM. Since SM is secure under the semi-honest model, we claim that SBOR is also
secure under the semi-honest model.
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4.6 Proof of Security for SF
Without loss of generality, let the execution image of SF for P2 be denoted by ΠP2(SF), and is given as (according to
Algorithm 5)
ΠP2(SF) = {Zi,j , ui,j | for 1 ≤ j ≤ w}
where ui,j is derived upon decrypting Zi,j (at step 2(b) of Algorithm 5). Suppose the simulated image of P2 be
denoted by ΠSP2(SF) which can be given by
ΠSP2(SF) = {Z
∗
i,j , u
∗
i,j | for 1 ≤ j ≤ w}
Here Z∗i,j is randomly generated from ZN2 . Also, u∗i is a vector generated at random such that exactly one of them is 0
and the rest are random numbers in ZN . SinceEpk is a semantically secure encryption scheme with resulting ciphertext
size less thanN2, Zi,j is computationally indistinguishable fromZ∗i,j . Also, since pii is a random permutation function
known only to P1, ui will be a vector with exactly one zero (at random location) and the rest are random numbers in
ZN . Hence, ui is computationally indistinguishable from u∗i . Thus, we can claim that ΠP2(SF) is computationally
indistinguishable from ΠSP2(SF).
On the other hand, let the execution image of P1 be denoted by ΠP1(SF), and is given by
ΠP1(SF) = {Ui,j | for 1 ≤ i ≤ k and 1 ≤ j ≤ w}
Here Ui,j is an encrypted value sent by P2 at step 2(c) of Algorithm 5. Suppose the simulated image of P1 be given
by
ΠSP1(SF) = {U
∗
i,j | for 1 ≤ i ≤ k and 1 ≤ j ≤ w}
whereU∗i,j is a random number in ZN2 . SinceEpk is a semantically secure encryption scheme with resulting ciphertext
size less than N2, Ui,j is computationally indistinguishable from U∗i,j . As a result, ΠP1(SF) is computationally
indistinguishable from ΠSP1(SF). Combining all the above results, we can claim that SF is secure under the semi-
honest model according on Definition 1.
5 The Proposed Protocol
In this section, we propose a novel privacy-preserving k-NN classification protocol, denoted by PPkNN, which is
constructed using the protocols discussed in Section 3 as building blocks. As mentioned earlier, we assume that
Alice’s database consists of n records, denoted by D = 〈t1, . . . , tn〉, and m+ 1 attributes, where ti,j denotes the jth
attribute value of record ti. Initially, Alice encrypts her database attribute-wise, that is, she computes Epk(ti,j), for
1 ≤ i ≤ n and 1 ≤ j ≤ m+1, where column (m+1) contains the class labels. Let the encrypted database be denoted
by D′. We assume that Alice outsources D′ as well as the future classification process to the cloud. Without loss of
generality, we assume that all attribute values and their Euclidean distances lie in [0, 2l). In addition, let w denote the
number of unique class labels in D.
In our problem setting, we assume the existence of two non-colluding semi-honest cloud service providers, denoted
by C1 and C2, which together form a federated cloud. Under this setting, Alice outsources her encrypted database D′
to C1 and the secret key sk to C2. Here it is possible for the data owner Alice to replace C2 with her private server.
However, if Alice has a private server, we can argue that there is no need for data outsourcing from Alice’s point
of view. The main purpose of using C2 can be motivated by the following two reasons. (i) With limited computing
resource and technical expertise, it is in the best interest of Alice to completely outsource its data management and
operational tasks to a cloud. For example, Alice may want to access her data and analytical results using a smart
phone or any device with very limited computing capability. (ii) Suppose Bob wants to keep his input query and
access patterns private from Alice. In this case, if Alice uses a private server, then she has to perform computations
assumed by C2 under which the very purpose of outsourcing the encrypted data to C1 is negated.
In general, whether Alice uses a private server or cloud service provider C2 actually depends on her resources. In
particular to our problem setting, we prefer to use C2 as this avoids the above mentioned disadvantages (i.e., in case
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of Alice using a private server) altogether. In our solution, after outsourcing encrypted data to the cloud, Alice does
not participate in any future computations.
The goal of the PPkNN protocol is to classify users’ query records using D′ in a privacy-preserving manner.
Consider an authorized user Bob who wants to classify his query record q = 〈q1, . . . , qm〉 based on D′ in C1. The
proposed PPkNN protocol mainly consists of the following two stages:
• Stage 1 - Secure Retrieval of k-Nearest Neighbors (SRkNN):
In this stage, Bob initially sends his query q (in encrypted form) to C1. After this, C1 and C2 involve in a set of
sub-protocols to securely retrieve (in encrypted form) the class labels corresponding to the k-nearest neighbors
of the input query q. At the end of this step, encrypted class labels of k-nearest neighbors are known only to C1.
• Stage 2 - Secure Computation of Majority Class (SCMCk):
Following from Stage 1, C1 and C2 jointly compute the class label with a majority voting among the k-nearest
neighbors of q. At the end of this step, only Bob knows the class label corresponding to his input query record
q.
The main steps involved in the proposed PPkNN protocol are as shown in Algorithm 6. We now explain each of the
two stages in PPkNN in detail.
5.1 Stage 1 : Secure Retrieval of k-Nearest Neighbors (SRkNN)
During Stage 1, Bob initially encrypts his query q attribute-wise, that is, he computesEpk(q) = 〈Epk(q1), . . . , Epk(qm)〉
and sends it to C1. The main steps involved in Stage 1 are shown as steps 1 to 3 in Algorithm 6. Upon receiving
Epk(q), C1 with private input (Epk(q), Epk(ti)) and C2 with the secret key sk jointly involve in the SSED protocol.
Here Epk(ti) = 〈Epk(ti,1), . . . , Epk(ti,m)〉, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. The output of this step, denoted by Epk(di), is the en-
cryption of squared Euclidean distance between q and ti, i.e., di = |q − ti|2. As mentioned earlier, Epk(di) is known
only to C1, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. We emphasize that the computation of exact Euclidean distance between encrypted vectors
is hard to achieve as it involves square root. However, in our problem, it is sufficient to compare the squared Euclidean
distances as it preserves relative ordering. Then, C1 with input Epk(di) and C2 securely compute the encryptions of
the individual bits of di using the SBD protocol. Note that the output [di] = 〈Epk(di,1), . . . , Epk(di,l)〉 is known only
to C1, where di,1 and di,l are the most and least significant bits of di, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, respectively.
After this, C1 and C2 compute the encryptions of class labels corresponding to the k-nearest neighbors of q in
an iterative manner. More specifically, they compute Epk(c′1) in the first iteration, Epk(c′2) in the second iteration,
and so on. Here c′s denotes the class label of sth nearest neighbor to q, for 1 ≤ s ≤ k. At the end of k iterations,
only C1 knows 〈Epk(c′1), . . . , Epk(c′k)〉. To start with, consider the first iteration. C1 and C2 jointly compute the
encryptions of the individual bits of the minimum value among d1, . . . , dn and encryptions of the location and class
label corresponding to dmin using the SMINn protocol. That is, C1 with input (θ1, . . . , θn) and C2 with sk com-
pute ([dmin], Epk(I), Epk(c′)), where θi = ([di], Epk(Iti), Epk(ti,m+1)), for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Here dmin denotes the
minimum value among d1, . . . , dn; Iti and ti,m+1 denote the unique identifier and class label corresponding to the
data record ti, respectively. Specifically, (Iti , ti,m+1) is the secret information associated with ti. For simplicity, this
paper assumes Iti = i. In the output, I and c′ denote the index and class label corresponding to dmin. The output
([dmin], Epk(I), Epk(c)) is known only to C1. Now, C1 performs the following operations locally:
• Assign Epk(c′) to Epk(c′1). Remember that, according to the SMINn protocol, c′ is equivalent to the class label
of the data record that corresponds to dmin. Thus, it is same as the class label of the most nearest neighbor to q.
• Compute the encryption of difference between I and i, where 1 ≤ i ≤ n. That is, C1 computes τi = Epk(i) ∗
Epk(I)
N−1 = Epk(i− I), for 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
• Randomize τi to get τ ′i = τ
ri
i = Epk(ri ∗ (i − I)), where ri is a random number in ZN . Note that τ ′i is an
encryption of either 0 or a random number, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Also, it is worth noting that exactly one of the entries
in τ ′ is an encryption of 0 (which happens iff i = I) and the rest are encryptions of random numbers. Permute
τ ′ using a random permutation function pi (known only to C1) to get β = pi(τ ′) and send it to C2.
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Algorithm 6 PPkNN(D′, q)→ cq
Require: C1 has D′ and pi; C2 has sk; Bob has q
1: Bob:
(a). Compute Epk(qj), for 1 ≤ j ≤ m
(b). Send Epk(q) = 〈Epk(q1), . . . , Epk(qm)〉 to C1
2: C1 and C2:
(a). C1 receives Epk(q) from Bob
(b). for i = 1 to n do:
• Epk(di)← SSED(Epk(q), Epk(ti))
• [di]← SBD(Epk(di))
3: for s = 1 to k do:
(a). C1 and C2:
• ([dmin], Epk(I), Epk(c
′))← SMINn(θ1, . . . , θn), where θi = ([di], Epk(Iti), Epk(ti,m+1))
• Epk(c
′
s)← Epk(c
′)
(b). C1:
• ∆← Epk(I)
N−1
• for i = 1 to n do:
– τi ← Epk(i) ∗∆
– τ ′i ← τ
ri
i , where ri ∈R ZN
• β ← pi(τ ′); send β to C2
(c). C2:
• Receive β from C1
• β′i ← Dsk(βi), for 1 ≤ i ≤ n
• Compute U ′, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n:
– if β′i = 0 then U ′i = Epk(1)
– else U ′i = Epk(0)
• Send U ′ to C1
(d). C1:
• Receive U ′ from C2 and compute V ← pi−1(U ′)
(e). C1 and C2, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n and 1 ≤ γ ≤ l:
• Epk(di,γ)← SBOR(Vi, Epk(di,γ))
4: SCMCk(Epk(c′1), . . . , Epk(c′k))
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Upon receiving β, C2 decrypts it component-wise to get β′i = Dsk(βi), for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. After this, he/she computes
an encrypted vector U ′ of length n such that Ui = Epk(1) if β′i = 0, and Epk(0) otherwise. Since exactly one of
entries in τ ′ is an encryption of 0, this further implies that exactly one of the entries in U ′ is an encryption of 1 and the
rest of them are encryptions of 0’s. It is important to note that if β′k = 0, then pi−1(k) is the index of the data record
that corresponds to dmin. Then, C2 sends U ′ to C1. After receiving U ′, C1 performs inverse permutation on it to get
V = pi−1(U ′). Note that exactly one of the entry in V is Epk(1) and the remaining are encryptions of 0’s. In addition,
if Vi = Epk(1), then ti is the most nearest tuple to q. However, C1 and C2 do not know which entry in V corresponds
to Epk(1).
Finally, C1 updates the distance vectors [di] due to the following reason:
• It is important to note that the first nearest tuple to q should be obliviously excluded from further computations.
However, since C1 does not know the record corresponding to Epk(c′1), we need to obliviously eliminate the
possibility of choosing this record again in next iterations. For this, C1 obliviously updates the distance corre-
sponding to Epk(c′1) to the maximum value, i.e., 2l− 1. More specifically, C1 updates the distance vectors with
the help of C2 using the SBOR protocol as below, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n and 1 ≤ γ ≤ l.
Epk(di,γ) = SBOR(Vi, Epk(di,γ))
Note that when Vi = Epk(1), the corresponding distance vector di is set to the maximum value. That is, under
this case, [di] = 〈Epk(1), . . . , Epk(1)〉. On the other hand, when Vi = Epk(0), the OR operation has no effect
on the corresponding encrypted distance vector.
The above process is repeated until k iterations, and in each iteration [di] corresponding to the current chosen label is
set to the maximum value. However, C1 and C2 do not know which [di] is updated. In iteration s, Epk(c′s) is returned
only to C1. At the end of Stage 1, C1 has 〈Epk(c′1), . . . , Epk(c′k)〉 - the list of encrypted class labels of k-nearest
neighbors to the input query q.
5.2 Stage 2 : Secure Computation of Majority Class (SCMCk)
Without loss of generality, suppose Alice’s dataset D consists of w unique class labels denoted by c = 〈c1, . . . , cw〉.
We assume that Alice outsources her list of encrypted classes to C1. That is, Alice outsources 〈Epk(c1), . . . , Epk(cw)〉
to C1 along with her encrypted database D′ during the data outsourcing step. Note that, for security reasons, Alice
may add dummy categories into the list to protect the number of class labels, i.e., w from C1 and C2. However, for
simplicity, we assume that Alice does not add any dummy categories to c.
During Stage 2, C1 with private inputs Λ = 〈Epk(c1), . . . , Epk(cw)〉 and Λ′ = 〈Epk(c′1), . . . , Epk(c′k)〉, and C2
with sk securely compute Epk(cq). Here cq denotes the majority class label among c′1, . . . , c′k. At the end of stage 2,
only Bob knows the class label cq .
The overall steps involved in Stage 2 are shown in Algorithm 7. To start with, C1 and C2 jointly compute the
encrypted frequencies of each class label using the k-nearest set as input. That is, they compute Epk(f(ci)) using
(Λ,Λ′) asC1’s input to the secure frequency (SF) protocol, for 1 ≤ i ≤ w. The output 〈Epk(f(c1)), . . . , Epk(f(cw))〉
is known only toC1. Then,C1 withEpk(f(ci)) andC2 with sk involve in the secure bit-decomposition (SBD) protocol
to compute [f(ci)], that is, vector of encryptions of the individual bits of f(ci), for 1 ≤ i ≤ w. After this, C1 and
C2 jointly involve in the SMAXw protocol. Briefly, SMAXw utilizes the sub-routine SMAX to eventually compute
([fmax], Epk(cq)) in an iterative fashion. Here [fmax] = [max(f(c1), . . . , f(cw))] and cq denotes the majority class
out of Λ′. At the end, the output ([fmax], Epk(cq)) is known only to C1. After this, C1 computes γq = Epk(cq + rq),
where rq is a random number in ZN known only to C1. Then, C1 sends γq to C2 and rq to Bob. Upon receiving γq,
C2 decrypts it to get the randomized majority class label γ′q = Dsk(γq) and sends it to Bob. Finally, upon receiving
rq from C1 and γ′q from C2, Bob computes the output class label corresponding to q as cq = γ′q − rq mod N .
5.3 Security Analysis of PPkNN under the Semi-honest Model
Here we provide a formal security proof for the proposed PPkNN protocol under the semi-honest model. First of all,
we stress that due to the encryption of q and by semantic security of the Paillier cryptosystem, Bob’s input query q is
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Algorithm 7 SCMCk(Epk(c′1), . . . , Epk(c′k))→ cq
Require: 〈Epk(c1), . . . , Epk(cw)〉, 〈Epk(c′1), . . . , Epk(c′k)〉 are known only to C1; sk is known only to C2
1: C1 and C2:
(a). 〈Epk(f(c1)), . . . , Epk(f(cw))〉 ← SF(Λ,Λ′), where Λ = 〈Epk(c1), . . . , Epk(cw)〉, Λ′ = 〈Epk(c′1), . . . ,
Epk(c
′
k)〉
(b). for i = 1 to w do:
• [f(ci)]← SBD(Epk(f(ci)))
(c). ([fmax], Epk(cq))← SMAXw(ψ1, . . . , ψw), where ψi = ([f(ci)], Epk(ci)), for 1 ≤ i ≤ w
2: C1:
(a). γq ← Epk(cq) ∗ Epk(rq), where rq ∈R ZN
(b). Send γq to C2 and rq to Bob
3: C2:
(a). Receive γq from C1
(b). γ′q ← Dsk(γq); send γ′q to Bob
4: Bob:
(a). Receive rq from C1 and γ′q from C2
(b). cq ← γ′q − rq mod N
protected from Alice, C1 and C2 in our PPkNN protocol. Apart from guaranteeing query privacy, remember that the
goal of PPkNN is to protect data confidentiality and hide data access patterns.
In this paper, to prove a protocol’s security under the semi-honest model, we adopted the well-known security
definitions from the literature of secure multiparty computation (SMC). More specifically, as mentioned in Section
2.3, we adopt the security proofs based on the standard simulation paradigm [26]. For presentation purpose, we
provide formal security proofs (under the semi-honest model) for Stages 1 and 2 of PPkNN separately. Note that the
outputs returned by each sub-protocol are in encrypted form and known only to C1.
5.3.1 Proof of Security for Stage 1
As mentioned earlier, the computations involved in Stage 1 of PPkNN are given as steps 1 to 3 in Algorithm 6. For
ease of presentation, we consider the messages exchanged between C1 and C2 in a single iteration (however, similar
analysis can be deduced for other iterations).
According to Algorithm 6, the execution image of C2 is given by
ΠC2(PPkNN) = {〈βi, β′i〉 | for 1 ≤ i ≤ n}
where βi is an encrypted value which is random in ZN2 . Also, β′i is derived upon decrypting βi by C2. Remember
that, exactly one of the entries in β′ is 0 and the rest are random numbers in ZN . Without loss of generality, let the
simulated image of C2 be denoted by ΠSC2(PPkNN) and is given as
ΠSC2(PPkNN) = {〈a
′
1,i, a
′
2,i〉 | for 1 ≤ i ≤ n}
here a′1,i is randomly generated from ZN2 and the vector a′2 is randomly generated in such a way that exactly one of
the entries is 0 and the rest are random numbers in ZN . Since Epk is a semantically secure encryption scheme with
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resulting ciphertext size less than ZN2 , we claim that βi is computationally indistinguishable from a′1,i. In addition,
since the random permutation function pi is known only to C1, β′ is a random vector of exactly one 0 and random
numbers in ZN . Thus, β′ is computationally indistinguishable from a′2. By combining the above results, we can
conclude that ΠC2(PPkNN) is computationally indistinguishable from ΠSC2(PPkNN). This implies that C2 does not
learn anything during the execution of Stage 1 in PPkNN.
On the other hand, suppose the execution image of C1 be denoted by ΠC1(PPkNN), and is given by
ΠC1(PPkNN) = {U ′}
where U ′ is an encrypted value sent by C2 (at step 3(c) of Algorithm 6). Let the simulated image of C1 in Stage 1 be
denoted by ΠSC1(PPkNN), which is given as
ΠSC1(PPkNN) = {a
′}
The value of a′ is randomly generated from ZN2 . SinceEpk is a semantically secure encryption scheme with resulting
ciphertexts in ZN2 , we claim that U ′ is computationally indistinguishable from a′. This implies that ΠC1(PPkNN) is
computationally indistinguishable from ΠSC1(PPkNN). Hence,C1 cannot learn anything during the execution of Stage
1 in PPkNN. Combining all these results together, it is clear that Stage 1 of PPkNN is secure under the semi-honest
model.
In each iteration, it is worth pointing out that C1 and C2 do not know which data record belongs to current
global minimum. Thus, data access patterns are protected from both C1 and C2. Informally speaking, at step 3(c) of
Algorithm 6, a component-wise decryption of β reveals the tuple that satisfy the current global minimum distance to
C2. However, due to the random permutation by C1, C2 cannot trace back to the corresponding data record. Also,
note that decryption operations on vector β by C2 will result in exactly one 0 and the rest of the results are random
numbers in ZN . Similarly, since U ′ is an encrypted vector, C1 cannot know which tuple corresponds to current global
minimum distance.
5.3.2 Security Proof for Stage 2
In a similar fashion, we can formally prove that Stage 2 of PPkNN is secure under the semi-honest model. Briefly,
since the sub-protocols SF, SBD, and SMAXw are secure, no information is revealed to C2. On the other hand, the
operations performed by C1 are entirely on encrypted data; therefore, no information is revealed to C1.
Furthermore, the output data of Stage 1 which are passed as input to Stage 2 are in encrypted format. Therefore,
the sequential composition of the two stages lead to our PPkNN protocol and we claim it to be secure under the semi-
honest model according to the Composition Theorem [26]. In particular, based on the above discussions, it is clear that
the proposed PPkNN protocol protects the confidentiality of the data, user’s input query, and also hides data access
patterns from Alice, C1, and C2. Note that Alice does not participate in any computations of PPkNN.
5.4 Security under the Malicious model
The next step is to extend our PPkNN protocol into a secure protocol under the malicious model. Under the malicious
model, an adversary (i.e., either C1 or C2) can arbitrarily deviate from the protocol to gain some advantage (e.g.,
learning additional information about inputs) over the other party. The deviations include, as an example, forC1 (acting
as a malicious adversary) to instantiate the PPkNN protocol with modified inputs (say Epk(q′) and Epk(t′i)) and to
abort the protocol after gaining partial information. However, in PPkNN, it is worth pointing out that neitherC1 norC2
knows the results of Stages 1 and 2. In addition, all the intermediate results are either random or pseudo-random values.
Thus, even when an adversary modifies the intermediate computations he/she cannot gain any additional information.
Nevertheless, as mentioned above, the adversary can change the intermediate data or perform computations incorrectly
before sending them to the honest party which may eventually result in the wrong output. Therefore, we need to ensure
that all the computations performed and messages sent by each party are correct.
Remember that the main goal of SMC is to ensure the honest parties to get the correct result and to protect
their private input data from the malicious parties. Therefore, under the two-party SMC scenario, if both parties are
malicious, there is no point to develop or adopt an SMC protocol at the first place. In the literature of SMC [14],
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it is the norm that at most one party can be malicious under the two-party scenario. When only one of the party is
malicious, the standard way of preventing the malicious party from misbehaving is to let the honest party validate the
other party’s work using zero-knowledge proofs [11]. However, checking the validity of computations at each step of
PPkNN can significantly increase the overall cost.
An alternative approach, as proposed in [36], is to instantiate two independent executions of the PPkNN protocol
by swapping the roles of the two parties in each execution. At the end of the individual executions, each party
receives the output in encrypted form. This is followed by an equality test on their outputs. More specifically, suppose
Epk1(cq,1) and Epk2(cq,2) be the outputs received by C1 and C2 respectively, where pk1 and pk2 are their respective
public keys. Note that the outputs in our case are in encrypted format and the corresponding ciphertexts (resulted from
the two executions) are under two different public key domains. Therefore, we stress that the equality test based on the
additive homomorphic encryption properties which was used in [36] is not applicable to our problem. Nevertheless,
C1 and C2 can perform the equality test based on the traditional garbled-circuit technique [35].
5.5 Complexity Analysis
The computation complexity of Stage 1 in PPkNN is bounded by O(n) instantiations of SBD and SSED, O(k) in-
stantiations of SMINn, and O(n ∗ k ∗ l) instantiations of SBOR. We emphasize that the computation complexity of
the SBD protocol proposed in [50] is bounded by O(l) encryptions and O(l) exponentiations (under the assumption
that encryption and decryption operations based on Paillier cryptosystem take similar amount of time). Also, the
computation complexity of SSED is bounded by O(m) encryptions and O(m) exponentiations. In addition, the com-
putation complexity of SMINn is bounded by O(l ∗ n ∗ log2 n) encryptions and O(l ∗ n ∗ log2 n) exponentiations.
Since SBOR utilizes SM as a sub-routine, the computation cost of SBOR is bounded by (small) constant number of
encryptions and exponentiations. Based on the above analysis, the total computation complexity of Stage 1 is bounded
by O(n ∗ (l +m+ k ∗ l ∗ log2 n)) encryptions and exponentiations.
On the other hand, the computation complexity of Stage 2 is bounded by O(w) instantiations of SBD, and one
instantiation of both SF and SMAXw. Here the computation complexity of SF is bounded by O(k ∗ w) encryptions
and O(k ∗w) exponentiations. Therefore, the total computation complexity of Stage 2 is bounded by O(w ∗ (l + k +
l ∗ log2 w)) encryptions and exponentiations.
In general, w ≪ n, therefore, the computation cost of Stage 1 should be significantly higher than that of Stage 2.
This observation is further justified by our empirical results given in the next section.
6 Empirical Results
In this section, we discuss some experiments demonstrating the performance of our PPkNN protocol under different
parameter settings. We used the Paillier cryptosystem [45] as the underlying additive homomorphic encryption scheme
and implemented the proposed PPkNN protocol in C. Various experiments were conducted on a Linux machine with
an Intel R© Xeon R© Six-CoreTM CPU 3.07 GHz processor and 12GB RAM running Ubuntu 12.04 LTS.
To the best of our knowledge, our work is the first effort to develop a secure k-NN classifier under the semi-honest
model. Thus, there is no existing work to compare with our approach. Therefore, we evaluate the performance of our
PPkNN protocol under different parameter settings.
6.1 Dataset and Experimental Setup
For our experiments, we used the Car Evaluation dataset from the UCI KDD archive [9]. The dataset consists of
1728 data records (i.e., n = 1728) with 6 input attributes (i.e., m = 6). Also, there is a separate class attribute and
the dataset is categorized into four different classes (i.e., w = 4). We encrypted this dataset attribute-wise, using the
Paillier encryption whose key size is varied in our experiments, and the encrypted data were stored on our machine.
Based on our PPkNN protocol, we then executed a random query over this encrypted data. For the rest of this section,
we do not discuss about the performance of Alice since it is a one-time cost. Instead, we evaluate and analyze the
performances of the two stages in PPkNN separately.
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Figure 2: Computation costs of PPkNN for varying number of k nearest neighbors and different encryption key sizes
in bits (K)
6.2 Performance of PPkNN
We first evaluated the computation costs of Stage 1 in PPkNN for varying number of k-nearest neighbors. Also, the
Paillier encryption key size K is either 512 or 1024 bits. The results are shown in Figure 2(a). For K=512 bits, the
computation cost of Stage 1 varies from 9.98 to 46.16 minutes when k is changed from 5 to 25, respectively. On
the other hand, when K=1024 bits, the computation cost of Stage 1 varies from 66.97 to 309.98 minutes when k is
changed from 5 to 25, respectively. In either case, we observed that the cost of Stage 1 grows almost linearly with
k. In addition, for any given k, we identified that the cost of Stage 1 increases by almost a factor of 7 whenever K is
doubled. For example, when k=10, Stage 1 took 19.06 and 127.72 minutes to generate the encrypted class labels of
the 10 nearest neighbors under K=512 and 1024 bits, respectively. Furthermore, when k=5, we observe that around
66.29% of cost in Stage 1 is accounted due to SMINn which is initiated k times in PPkNN (once in each iteration).
Also, the cost incurred due to SMINn increases from 66.29% to 71.66% when k is increased from 5 to 25.
We now evaluate the computation costs of Stage 2 for varying k and K . As shown in Figure 2(b), for K=512 bits,
the computation time for Stage 2 to generate the final class label corresponding to the input query varies from 0.118
to 0.285 seconds when k is changed from 5 to 25. On the other hand, for K=1024 bits, Stage 2 took 0.789 and 1.89
seconds when k = 5 and 25, respectively. The low computation costs of Stage 2 were due to SMAXw which incurs
significantly less computations than SMINn in Stage 1. This further justifies our theoretical analysis in Section 5.5.
Note that, in our dataset, w=4 and n=1728. Like in Stage 1, for any given k, the computation time of Stage 2 increases
by almost a factor of 7 whenever K is doubled. E.g., when k=10, the computation time of Stage 2 varies from 0.175
to 1.158 seconds when the encryption key size K is changed from 512 to 1024 bits. As shown in Figure 2(b), a similar
analysis can be observed for other values of k and K .
Based on the above results, it is clear that the computation cost of Stage 1 is significantly higher than that of Stage
2 in PPkNN. Specifically, we observed that the computation time of Stage 1 accounts for at least 99% of the total time
in PPkNN. For example, when k = 10 and K=512 bits, the computation costs of Stage 1 and 2 are 19.06 minutes
and 0.175 seconds, respectively. Under this scenario, cost of Stage 1 is 99.98% of the total cost of PPkNN. We also
observed that the total computation time of PPkNN grows almost linearly with n and k.
6.3 Performance Improvement of PPkNN
We now discuss two different ways to boost the efficiency of Stage 1 (as the performance of PPkNN depends pri-
marily on Stage 1) and empirically analyze their efficiency gains. First, we observe that some of the computations in
Stage 1 can be pre-computed. For example, encryptions of random numbers, 0s and 1s can be pre-computed (by the
corresponding parties) in the offline phase. As a result, the online computation cost of Stage 1 (denoted by SRkNNo)
is expected to be improved. To see the actual efficiency gains of such a strategy, we computed the costs of SRkNNo
and compared them with the costs of Stage 1 without an offline phase (simply denoted by SRkNN) and the results for
K = 1024 bits are shown in Figure 2(c). Irrespective of the values of k, we observed that SRkNNo is around 33%
faster than SRkNN. E.g., when k = 10, the computation costs of SRkNNo and SRkNN are 84.47 and 127.72 minutes,
respectively (boosting the online running time of Stage 1 by 33.86%).
25
Stage Communication Size (in MBytes) Network Delay (in seconds)
Stage 1 154.741 123.79
Stage 2 0.037 0.0296
Table 3: Communication sizes and network delays in PPkNN for k = 10 and K = 1024 bits
Our second approach to improve the performance of Stage 1 is by using parallelism. Since operations on data
records are independent of one another, we claim that most computations in Stage 1 can be parallelized. To empirically
evaluate this claim, we implemented a parallel version of Stage 1 (denoted by SRkNNp) using OpenMP programming
and compared its cost with the costs of SRkNN (i.e., the serial version of Stage 1). The results for K = 1024 bits are
shown in Figure 2(c). The computation cost of SRkNNp varies from 12.02 to 55.5 minutes when k is changed from 5
to 25. We observe that SRkNNp is almost 6 times more efficient than SRkNN. This is because our machine has 6 cores
and thus computations can be run in parallel on 6 separate threads. Based on the above discussions, it is clear that
efficiency of Stage 1 can indeed be improved significantly using parallelism. Moreover, we can also use the existing
map-reduce techniques to execute parallel operations on multiple nodes to drastically improve the performance further.
Hence, the level of achievable performance in PPkNN actually depends on the implementation.
On the other hand, Bob’s computation cost in PPkNN is mainly due to the encryption of his input query. In our
dataset, Bob’s computation cost is 4 and 17 milliseconds whenK is 512 and 1024 bits, respectively. It is apparent that
PPkNN is very efficient from Bob’s computational perspective which is especially beneficial when he issues queries
from a resource-constrained device (such as mobile phone and PDA).
6.4 Communication Costs of PPkNN
The communication costs of PPkNN for k = 10 and K = 1024 bits are shown in Table 3. Specifically, the total
communication sizes of Stages 1 and 2 in PPkNN are 154.741 and 0.037 MB, respectively. By assuming a standard
10 Mbps LAN setting, the corresponding network delays between C1 and C2 are 123.79 and 0.0296 seconds, respec-
tively. Here it is evident that the total network delay (around 2 minutes) of PPkNN is significantly less than its total
computation cost. Similar conclusions can be drawn for other parameter settings.
7 Conclusion
Classification is an important task in many data mining applications such as detection of fraud by credit card compa-
nies and prediction of tumor cells levels in blood. To protect user privacy, various privacy-preserving classification
techniques have been proposed in the literature for the past decade. Nevertheless, the existing techniques are not ap-
plicable in outsourced database environment where the data resides in encrypted form on a third-party server. Along
this direction, this paper proposed a novel privacy-preserving k-NN classification protocol over encrypted data in the
cloud. Our protocol protects the confidentiality of the data, user’s input query, and hides the data access patterns. We
also evaluated the performance of our protocol under different parameter settings.
Since improving the efficiency of SMINn is an important first step for improving the performance of our PPkNN
protocol, we plan to investigate alternative and more efficient solutions to the SMINn problem in our future work.
Also, in this paper, we used the well-known k-NN classifier and developed a privacy-preserving protocol for it over
encrypted data. As a future work, we will investigate and extend our research to other classification algorithms.
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